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THE LITIGATION CRISIS: COMPETITVENESS AND

OTHER MEASURES. OF QUALMY OF LIFE
DAVID

I.

W. BARNES*

INTRODUCTION

It is alleged that there are too many lawyers, 1 that there is too much
litigation, 2 and that legal costs are too high.3 America, it is alleged, has

seventy percent of the world's lawyers. 4 In a recent ten-year period, it is
alleged, product liability suits increased eight hundred and fifty percent 5
The legal system, it is alleged, costs $300 billion a year.6 Professor Galanter challenges some of these numbers, but I urge you to assume they
are true and to then ask: SO WHAT? IS THIS TOO MUCH OR TOO
LITTLE?

H.

COMPETIrTrENEss

An alarm sounds in my brain when I am forced to deal with "too
much" questions like these. I need to know "too much compared to
what?" The topic for this discussion of overlawyering and competitiveness
provides one framework for discussing what is the optimal number of lawyers or amount of litigation. Relating overlawyering to global competitiveness, as the organizers of this program did, suggests that laws, lawyers and
lawsuits interfere with America's ability to compete with other countries.
Being competitive apparently means keeping production costs down in
the United States in order to beat-out foreign goods in the international
marketplace. Charging lower prices expands the market share of domestic corporations, increases employment, and makes us wealthier at the expense of others. This results in increased economic growth (in the United
States, at any rate), which sounds pretty good. If the only purpose of lawyers is to contribute to competitiveness, then the optimal number of lawyers must be the number that leads to the greatest increase in economic
growth.
*
Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law, A.B., 1972, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1979, University of Pennsylvania Law School; MA, Ph.D., Economics, 1980, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
1. Stephen P. Magee, How Many Lamyers Ruin an Economy, WALL ST.J., Sept. 24, 1992,

at A17.
2. Marc Galanter, Address at the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 1, 1992).
3. See Michaelj. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behaviorof the Tort Litigation
System - and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L REv. 1147, 1152-53 (1992).
4. Galanter, supra note 2.
5. Saks, supranote 3, at 1162-66 (discussing the basis for such a claim while not necessarily agreeing with it).
6. Galanter, supra note 2.
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If competitiveness is our concern, we are fortunate that Professor Stephen Magee from the University of Texas Business School has calculated
the optimal number of lawyers. 7 The "Magee Curve" is a rainbow arching
from the point of no lawyers and relatively low economic growth up to a
peak of high economic growth and the optimal number of lawyers, and
ending down at the point of low economic growth and too many lawyers.
You may be fascinated to know that the optimal number of lawyers - the
peak of the rainbow - is twenty-three lawyers per thousand white collar
workers.8 We have thirty-eight lawyers per thousand in the United States, 9
a surplus of lawyers who apparently only interfere with the quality of life.
Shakespeare said, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." 10 If
he had been an economist, he might have said, "Let's kill fifteen of every
thirty-eight lawyers." (Not iambic pentameter, but it might maximize
growth rates.)
III.

OTHER PUPOSES FOR LAW4ERS

The "Magee Rainbow" seems to confirm the suspicion that there are
too many lawyers, but it also focuses our attention on why lawyers exist at
all. Is the purpose of lawyers to generate economic growth? If so, we can
cancel two-thirds of the law school curriculum. We'lljust teach contracts,
commercial law, and corporations. Naturally, we'll do away with tax, labor
and environmental law, torts, and a hundred other offerings.
But somehow I had the impression that clients hired lawyers to vindicate their rights. I thought litigation was the means by which American
citizens kept the government from exceeding its constitutional authority.
12
I thought tort law was to deter wrongdoers," to furnish compensation
and to provide us with a civilized outlet for our anger at those who cause
injury.' 3 What happened to these purposes of the law? Another author,
complaining about the costs of litigation, raises the ultimate horror.
"[L]ife would be intolerable," he says, "if every man insisted on his legal
rights to the full."1

4

The Insurance Information Institute complains that

15
"the civil justice system is being used to right every imaginable wrong."
How rude that people in a civilized society should resort to the courtsl
They should be in the streets, throwing bombs, assassinating public officials, and blowing up police stations!

7. Magee, supranote 1, at A17.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. WLLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2.
11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.14 (4th ed. 1992).
12. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 5-6 (5th
ed. 1984).
13. Id. at 16; see also ROBERT L.RABrIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAw 1 (1976).
14. WALTER K. OLSON, THE LTmGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAwsurr 223 (1991) (quoting Frederich Pollock, JusPRUDENCE, but not citing
any identifiable source), quoted in Randy M. Mastro, The Myth of the LitigationExplosion, 60
FoAmnHt, L. REVIEw 199, 200 n.18 (1992) (book review).
15. Saks, supra note 3, at 1157.
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IV.

GROWTH VERSUS ()

QUALIY OF LIFE

When thinking about how much litigation is "too much," we should
think in terms of the broader goals of a legal system and a set of legal
doctrines. Proponents of rules facilitating recovery by torts plaintiffs, for
instance, particularly in the products liability area, come from both liberal
and conservative political perspectives. The liberals' main concern is fair17
16
ness in sharing the burden of accident costs and promoting safety. Imposing liability on manufacturers addresses these concerns because
manufacturers can sometimes spread the costs to customers, and, where
they cannot, they can explore and implement safety measures. 18 The conservatives' main concern is maximizing society's wealth, which imposing
liability on the manufacturers would do, at least whenever manufacturers
can avoid the risks of a product at the lowest cost. 19 Whatever their goals,
all would agree that making some manufacturers of defective products pay
for injuries caused by their products improves what they perceive as the
quality of life in America.
It is hard to escape the fact that quality of life has a variety of dimensions. Tangible increases in wealth or Gross Domestic Product appeal to
conservatives concerned with efficient shifting of risks among those involved in accidents. Intangible improvements in victims' ability to redress
wrongs and redistribute wealth appeal to liberals. But the national debate
over the litigation crisis and competitiveness ignores the fundamental purposes of litigation, the fundamental goals underlying the purported expansion of legal doctrine, and the fundamental tradeoff between tangible
and intangible well-being. Even though compensation by defendants may
interfere with increases in economic growth, a rational society could still
desire compensation.
Many social goals may, in the short run, interfere with global competitiveness, but that does not mean we should abandon those goals. The
large number of lawyers may very well decrease the rate of economic
16. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primeron Feminist Theory and Tort, 38J. LEGAL EDuc. 3,
31-32 (1988).
17. SeeEscolav. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,J.,
concurring) ("It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard
against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot .... Against such a risk there should
be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such
protection."). Id. at 440-41.
18. Id. at 441.
19. See, e.g., Guimo CALABRxsi, THE CosrS OF AccmuDNrs, A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYsS 26 (1970). According to Calabresi:
Apart from the requirements of justice, I take it as axiomatic that the principle
function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs
of avoiding accidents. (Such incidental benefits as providing a respectable livelihood for a large number ofjudges, lawyers, and insurance agents are at best beneficent side effects.)
Id. See also STEVEN SHAVEu., ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF AccmENrT LAw 298 (1987). Shavell states:
Whether liability can be so justified for a particular area of accident is a question
that will merit careful consideration in view of the opportunity to employ safety
regulation and other approaches for controlling risk, in view of the administrative
costs of the liability system, and especially in view of the difference between the
social and private interest in using the liability system ....
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growth, but the number of lawyers is partially a function of the increased
law school enrollments of women and minorities. Should the growth rate
in the legal community of those disempowered groups be curtailed in order to reach some optimum and increase global competition? The optimum must take into account such side-benefits associated with the
increased number of lawyers.
V.

NUMBERS MAY NOT

TELL ALL

It would not be surprising to find more lawyers per capita in the
United States if Americans truly had more legal rights, more protection
from public or private actors and a higher level of intangible well-being
than people in other countries. If it takes lawyers to create this well-being
and to protect those rights, then some countries may possess more lawyers
because they want to protect more rights - a consideration independent
of a country's desire for economic growth. In searching for standards for
how much lawyering is "too much," Professor Galanter looks to other
places and other times, comparing the number of lawyers in various coun20
tries and at other times in our country.
Why not look instead at the quality of rights in other countries and
see how that relates to litigation rates in those countries? In which countries would you guess people possess rights most like our own? Perhaps
those reflecting the British common law system, the "Anglo-American" system ofjurisprudence. In which industrialized areas would you guess litigation rates are in the same range as our own? England, Australia, and
Canada. 2 ' The similarity cannot simply be cultural because European, African, and Asian cultures enrich our country. It is because our structure of
legal rights is so fundamentally British.2 2 Perhaps having more rights does
require more lawyers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Professor Priest treats tort law as if the only goal worth worrying about
is minimizing the costs associated with risks.23 Imposing strict liability for
injuries from products, for instance, shifts the risks to manufacturers, who
then have an incentive to avoid the risks or to insure against them. Because society wants to minimize costs and because people can insure themselves less expensively than manufacturers can insure them, Priest argues,
there is too much risk-shifting. 24 But there is more to tort law than the
attempts to minimize costs by shifting risks. The desire to effectuate rights
and compensate victims coexists with the desire to shift costs onto those in
20. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape ofDisputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And
Think We Know) About OurAlegedly Contentious and LitigiousSociety, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 51-61
(1983).
21. 1d. at 52.
22. HARRY W. JoNEs ET A., LFGAL METHOD, CASEs AND TExT MATERLAlS 5 (1980).
23. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The CurrentInsurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE
LJ. 1521 (1987); George L. Priest, The New Legal Structure ofRisk Contro, DAEDALus, Fall 1990,

at 207.
24. Priest, supra note 23, at 1524-25.
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the best position to minimize them. The goals of minimizing conflict, internalizing costs, compensating victims, and creating incentives for accident cost-minimization all figure into the optimallevel of lawyering and the
optimal legal doctrine.
If lawyers and the law serve goals other than economic growth, perhaps we should be pleased we have more than the economically optimal
number indicated by Magee's Rainbow - the more lawyers, the more service to society's noneconomic goals. The pot of gold is never at the top of
the rainbow, anyway. It is at the end. So as you listen to arguments about
whether there is "too much" lawyering and '!too many" rights, think about
whether there is more to law than promoting economic growth.

